Analysis
This area of the survey investigates what many see as
a fundamental mark of sovereignty: policing and defence.
What is immediately apparent from our respondents is that
they see these areas as requiring cooperation between
states, be that within the EU which is directly
addressed or otherwise.
Questions A-C
address this segment of analysis broadly, to generally
outline the issue as to whether there is value to
individual states in cooperating with other states. Over
90% agreed with the general premise in question A,
with only a minor deviation in support between the UK and
EU respondents. For question B almost
the same question is asked, but this time the European
Union is introduced as a central component of the
question. Again over 90% of the respondents supported
this notion, with a slight increase over the previous
question for the EU respondents and a slight decrease for
the UK respondents.
Increasing the role for the EU in question C,
to a common defence policy saw some of this support
drop away. But still, two-thirds of UK respondents and
three-quarters of EU respondents viewed cooperation at an
EU level in this area in a positive light. What this data
may indicate is that the respondents support general
cooperation between states, but are more guarded about
control of their police or defence forces being shared
either with central EU control, or with other member
states. This issue will be discussed further below.
Policing, security and defence, at an EU level, form
the second and third (of three) pillars
of the European Union. In this respect decisions on
these matters are made on an intergovernmental basis
within the Council
of the European Union (Council of Ministers). That
is, representatives from the national governments of each
member state vote on the matter, and implementation of
any measure usually requires unanimity.
These are all matters for the Treaty
on European Union, by which Title V provides for
common foreign and security policy and Title VI for
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
In general Title V avoids military and defence matters,
concentrating on foreign policy and security. Where, the
wider sense of security will include establishing stable
borders and the provision, protection and planning of
food and energy sources, for example, but not immigration
and asylum.
However, art 17(1) talks of the progressive framing of
a common defence policy, which might lead to a common
defence, any such measures to be in accordance with
the obligations of the member states with regard to
any other bodies (eg NATO, the Western European Union or
the United Nations). Within this text there is no direct
provision for raising or funding a European Defence
Force and so no such entity exists or is proposed by
the organs of the EU. This issue will be discussed more
fully below. It is worth bearing in mind that the impetus
for the creation of the EU was the devastation caused by
two major wars in the first half of the 20th century. It
probably would not be too extreme a view to speculate, in
that light, that a future crisis may bring about a
unified defence force for the region.
The provisions of Title VI call for greater
cooperation between the member states in policing, either
directly or indirectly (via the European Police Office
Europol),
and in justice, again directly or indirectly (via the
European Judicial Cooperation Unit Eurojust).
Within this element there is no call for a unified police
force or judiciary, merely cooperation between the
authorities of the member states. Two minor exceptions
apply, those are that the treaty calls for approximation
of the laws and regulations of the Member States
and there are provisions for enhanced cooperation
although what this may mean is not made explicit, and
should only occur as a last resort.
Respondents to questions A-C
would consequently appear to agree with the actual
provisions within EU legislation in this general area.
Looking at a more specific area, the respondents have
a less enthusiastic view over coordinated arrest,
detention and extradition, which is provided for within
Title VI,
and operated via Europol the European Arrest Warrant.
Question D is non-specific over the
legal provisions involved, with around 70% of respondents
from both surveys indicating that they support the
measure concerned. This may have dropped from the more
forthright views shown in questions A
and B, either due to the introduction of
terrorism (which may have negative connotations for the
judicial system in many peoples minds), or due to the
negative views they may have to the lack of judicial
oversight involved in fast track extraditions,
which have received much publicity in the UK (for example
the case of Gary
McKinnon).
At the heart of this matter lays a fundamental issue
of cooperation in crime and justice cross-border, and
that is whether there is trust in the foreign
system, and equivalence in its rules on law and
incarceration. What the respondents to question D
may be indicating is that there is some doubt in their
minds over these issues. However, in question E
the same issue is placed within an EU framework, with the
result that there is a substantial rise in the backing of
the UK respondents for this measure, and a small increase
from the EU respondents. This finding is counter to the
premise that this survey sought to prove: that there is a
prejudice against EU institutions, for equal matters of
law. What is shown in questions D and E
appears to be that the respondents actually prefer the
involvement of the EU as opposed to an undesignated
provision between states. Therefore the conclusion may
not be that the EU is a positive aspect in this area, but
that it is a less negative aspect than other forms of
international cooperation.
The basis for the inclusion of crime and justice
cooperation within the competence of the institutions of
the EU, rather than purely national measures, is that the
free movement of citizens and a lack of border controls
between states in the Schengen
area called for EU-level coordination.
Thus sensitive areas of national policy became part of
Community law and policy. Although the United Kingdom and
Ireland had opted-out of Schengen as a whole they have
both since opted-in to the measures facilitating
cooperation on policing and justice in relation to
criminal matters.
The final area of this section of the survey is not
directly related to the EU, questions F
and G essentially seek to understand the
respondents beliefs on common defence between the member
states. Participating states in these scenarios were
chosen arbitrarily but evidently concern three
Western European (EU-15) and one Eastern European member
state. Of those surveyed 69% of UK respondents and 80% of
EU respondents believed that the UK and Belgium
(respectively) should assist Spain if it were attacked by
a third country. Three rationales for this high level of
support exist: (i) that the treaty obligations involved
are understood, (ii) that it is understood that a threat
to the security of a relatively close neighbour is a
threat to ones own security, (iii) that there is a
spirit of solidarity between these nations.
Explanation (i) may have some basis for the EU
respondents, but not for the UK respondents where the
attribution of treaty obligations appears misunderstood
(discussed below). Explanation (ii) and (iii) are
possible, and have equal validity between the sets of
respondents. The central reason that explanation (i) can
be rejected for the UK respondents is illustrated in
question G where only 37% of respondents correctly
identified the obligation of the UK to defend Poland as
originating in NATO
(clearly the UK has a similar obligation to defend the
other NATO member states, that includes Spain and
Belgium). As detailed above there is no mutual defence
policy within the EU, only a call for cooperation,
likewise no such obligation exists in UN treaties. The
Warsaw Pact was the name given to the alliance of Eastern
European states, behind the Iron Curtain, prior to
the political changes in the early 1990s.
Regardless of the explanations for such, and the
alliances involved, the respondents appear to support
commitments by their governments to mutual defence
policies. It is submitted that this support would still
exist whether such alliances were organised through EU
institutions, rather than through NATO. Since the
rationale for joint action, neighbourhood or solidarity,
would continue to be apparent.
As noted above, there exists within the EU an ambition
to achieve closer cooperation in the area of security and
defence, and it would seem inevitable that this will come
about. Two examples illustrate this point. The first is
the interrelated nature and proximity of the EU member
states hostilities in one member state cannot help
but effect the economies and security of the other member
states. This issue is reinforced by the existing
recognition by the member states that cooperation is a
requirement whether that is justified by Schengen or
not. The second reason is that the economies of defence
may dictate closer cooperation in the future, with shared
resources and facilities. Although such practices have
not yet come to pass, it is significant that the EUs
two nuclear powers have been linked to a number of
initiatives to cooperate on defence: in the construction
of aircraft carriers, and most recently patrols
by nuclear submarines. A further example of this is
provided by the joint efforts of Germany, Italy, Spain
and the UK in the development of the Eurofighter.
However, enhanced cooperation in Europe will not
only be decided upon the matter of sovereignty, but also
upon differing foreign policy. Tensions have emerged
within the EU member states over divergent views in
international crises from Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia
through to Iraq and Afghanistan. Until such matters can
be resolved with a common foreign policy it seems a more
deeply integrated defence policy is difficult to achieve.
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